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PROXY POWER AND SOCIAL GOALS- HOW
CAMPAIGN GM SUCCEEDED
DONALD E. ScHwAaTz*
On August 31, 1970, General Motors announced the establishment
of a public policy committee, consisting of five outside directors, to ad-
vise management on matters which concern the public interest. Chair-
man James Roche said that the purpose of the committee was to give
matters of community concern "a permanent place on the highest level
of management."1
About a week earlier, GM shareholders received their second
quarterly report for 1970. A mere three pages of the report was devoted
to business news, as compared to five pages which dealt with such sub-
jects as environmental problems, product safety, aid to minorities, and
the fact that Ralph Nader had dispatched a group of students to study
the corporation and prepare a report.2
These expressions of concern for community problems ostensibly
responded to the efforts made earlier in the year by the Campaign to
Make General Motors Responsible - better known as Campaign GM.
While General Motors management declined to elaborate on why it
had formed a public responsibility committee, the press seemed not
to be in doubt. Thus, one commentator observed that "the committee,
which will report directly to the Board of Directors, is GM's apparent
answer to demands made by a group of critics at the last stockholder
meeting on May 22." 3
Campaign GM criticized GM management through a proxy con-
test mainly on behalf of two proposals. 4 Under the first - amendment
of the by-laws to authorize three additional directors - Campaign GM
hoped to place three persons representing public viewpoints pres-
ently unrepresented on GM's Board. The persons it intended to nom-
inate, if the proposal passed, were Dr. Rene Dubos, a professor of
biology at Rockefeller University and a leading ecologist, Miss Betty
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., Union University, 1952;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1955; LL.M., New York University, 1966. The author was
counsel to Campaign GM.
1 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
2 GM QUARTERLY REP., AUG. 1970.
3 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1970, at 1, col. 3. Another response was the election to the
board of Rev. Leon Sullivan, the first black so chosen. Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1971, at 6, col. 3.
See Stern, At Least One Share of Stock for the Public, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 4 (Re-
view of the Week), at 10, col. 1.
4 Proxy Statement of Campaign GM (Mar. 25, 1970).
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Furness, adviser to President Johnson on consumer affairs, and Rever-
end Channing Phillips, a community leader in Washington, D.C. and
the first black man nominated for President at a national party con-
vention. Pursuant to the second proposal, there was to be created an
ad hoc shareholder committee on corporate responsibility, which would
report directly to the shareholders by the next spring on the manner
in which the corporation had discharged its social responsibilities. In
effect, the group was to make a "social audit" of C-M and recommend
ways of dealing with current social problems. The membership of this
group was to be chosen by a three-man panel, consisting of a represen-
tative of the management, a representative of the UAW, and John D.
Rockefeller, IV, who was designated by Campaign GM as its repre-
sentative on the selection panel. Members of the committee would
reflect a broad base of community interests and not merely those of the
business community.
While GM's public responsibility committee may have been in
response to these proposals, it surely is not the same. Again, showing
that there was no doubt as to what impelled GM's decision, leading
newspapers sought Campaign GM's opinion of the GM action. The
company was commended for its decision, but there was no mistaking
the fact that Campaign GM thought the response inadequate. Thus, it
noted that the Chairman of the committee is John A. Mayer, Chairman
of the Mellon National Bank and Trust Company in Pittsburgh, which
has significant financial relations with the Gulf Oil Company. His
objectivity in dealing with any possible recommendation to scrap the
internal combustion engine is, at least, questionable. Another director
who serves on the committee is John T. Connor, former Secretary of
Commerce, who, following the annual meeting last May 22, expressed
great irritation with the questions raised by Campaign GM and others
about public policy matters discussed at directors' meetings. Mr. Con-
nor suggested that Board proceedings were none of the shareholder's
affairs, 5 which makes one wonder whose business it is.
Campaign GM's efforts gained less than three percent of the votes
at the annual meeting.6 While it was able to return to the proxy wars
again in the spring of 1971, it could not present the same proposals, by
reason of the proxy rules.7 Moreover, it is entirely possible that it will
not obtain a significant amount of additional votes this time. This state
5 Bus. WEEK, May 30. 1970, at 84.
6 See Wall St. J., May 25, 1970, at 4, col. 3; N.Y. Times, May 23, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
7 Rule 14a-8(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4) (1970).
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of affairs surely leads one to the following question: Is there any point
to waging a proxy contest to gain social objectives?
SocIAL AWARENESS AND BIG BUSINESS
To view the matter another way, many persons, particularly young
people, are distressed about what they perceive to be deteriorating
conditions in American life. They point to the corporation as being
largely responsible for this fact. They want change and many of them
feel that change is not possible within the framework of our existing
economic system. Some regard the destruction of the environment,
racism, and the Southeast Asian war all to be functions of the free enter-
prise system. Nor do they believe that shareholders can be expected to
make their companies more responsible because the shareholders profit
from these acts of irresponsibility. Furthermore, as any corporation
lawyer or student of corporations realizes, little power is in fact pos-
sessed by the shareholders. As Ralph Nader commented in the speech
which served as a kickoff for Campaign GM:
Nearly a million and a half'of these citizens and institutions are
shareholders in the company. In theory they own the company; in
fact, they have about the same rights as the owner of company de-
bentures. The procedures, the information, the organization, the
manpower and the funds are management's to deploy. But the fic-
tion of shareholder democracy continues to plague the reality. By
highlighting the fiction, a new reality can be borne that will tame
the corporate tiger.8
Notwithstanding the fact that formal shareholder power may be
a fiction, much can be gained by arguing with management through
the established forms of shareholder democracy. Probably the belief
held most consistently among the participants of Campaign GM was
that their main quarrel with corporations concerned the decision-
making structure of modern corporations. They felt that what was
most seriously lacking was an input of different approaches to economic
life which would be provided by persons of varying experiences and
viewpoints. Thus, the General Motors Board might well include per-
sons who honestly believe they represent the public interest, but who
in fact do not represent the public. By this reasoning, it is not sufficient
that the Board include persons who have concerned themselves with
problems of black people; the Board needed a black person. The same
is true of a woman, as we develop an increased consciousness of dis-
8 N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1970, at 44, col. 1.
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crimination against women. Of course, the Board included persons of
a scientific background, but their concern was technology not ecology.
Consequently, it was believed that the massive power that General
Motors possesses was used too single-mindedly for the pursuit of profits
without sufficient recognition of the public impact of this power.
The proxy contest infuses a new input into the decision-making
process. It brings heretofore unspoken decisions into the open. While
it is true that a debate about corporate policy could ensue at any time,
such a debate gains heightened focus when it is put into the time frame
and the specific language of a proxy contest. The public is likely to be
much more interested, and it will follow closely a debate which occurs
within the relatively short space of time allowed for a proxy contest,
rather than one which drifts endlessly and without specific focus. In-
jecting the public's interest into a corporate debate on public policy
may produce the "new reality" to which Mr. Nader referred.
The public's role, and the public interest, is seen most clearly in
the context of financial institutions. Universities, particularly, faced
hard decisions in Campaign GM. Students at various universities (e.g.,
Harvard, MIT, and Michigan) urged university officials to vote their
shares with Campaign GM.9 The university treasurer's dilemma is per-
plexing, however. He must find the funds for the university to success-
fully operate. At the same time, universities have power to use which
could be influential in shaping corporate policy, and thus, because of
the nature of the university, there might be an obligation to do so even
if it results in some cost.'0 In addition, the right of the student con-
stituency to be heard on the matter is also at issue, as is the right of
other constituency groups of other institutions (e.g., pensioners, in-
surance policy holders).
One of the main problems is that hard-headed businessmen simply
assume that corporate responsibility costs the shareholder more than
corporate irresponsibility and, even more, they really assume that the
shareholder can make money only if the business is conducted without
regard to social obligations. Little effort has been made to try to cal-
culate just how much of a loss there would be to shareholders by the
adoption of certain policies advocated by reformers. Significantly, as
a result of the proxy contest, future choices will probably be made
in the open, with competing views being aired.
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 19, 1970, at 30, col. 7; id., May 1, 1970, at 13, col. 1; id.,
Mar. 15, 1970, at 62, col. 4.
10 This is the recommendation of a special panel appointed by Harvard President
Nathan Pusey. See Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1971, at 3, col. 4.
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THE AFTERMATH OF THE CAMPAIGN
Doubtless the proxy contest has stirred others into thinking about
ways of achieving more representative decision-making bodies. For ex-
ample, the First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, the largest
bank in Philadelphia, has recently considered restructuring its Board,
i.e., turning over one-third of its twenty-four seats to consumer repre-
sentatives, young people, employees, blacks, poor people, and, perhaps,
militant women.11 Additionally, it has been noted that First Pennsyl-
vania contemplated voting its shares for Campaign GM during the
proxy contest but decided not to do so because they did not want to
ask General Motors to do something which they were not willing to do
themselves.' 2 The fact that they are now willing to do it themselves
perhaps indicates the likelihood of a different result the next time the
bank votes in a proxy contest similar to Campaign GM.
The Campaign GM leaders indicated on a number of occasions
that they believed that they had achieved success in the campaign
because they had forced General Motors into a debate on public policy
issues. This is indeed an inevitable feature of a public interest proxy
contest because management must respond in a manner that will appeal
to the public and not merely to profit instincts of the shareholders.
Politicians, too, are aware of the need to identify with the broader
public concerns in this kind of a proxy contest. During the course of
Campaign GM, a number of congressmen and senators vocalized their
support on behalf of Campaign GM. Indeed, Senator Muskie intro-
duced the Corporate Participation Bill'3 a month after the GM annual
meeting in order to facilitate such future proxy contests. In September,
Senator Gaylord Nelson introduced a bill which would require auto-
mobile companies to produce a pollution-free engine by 1975.14 A
resolution in almost identical terms was presented to the General
Motors management for inclusion in the proxy statement, but they ex-
cluded it and the SEC indicated that it would take no action on the
matter.' 5 Nonetheless, the point was frequently made, during the
campaign, that management should proceed to do this, and, in any
event, that it was irresponsible in not doing it.
It seems a fair conclusion that such a proxy contest can serve a
useful purpose to the objectives of reformers and success of such a con-
11 Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1970, at 14, col. 4.
12 Id.
13 S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also N.Y. Times, June 23, 1970, at 59, col. 2.
14 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Congress eventually adopted the Cleaner Air
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq., 84 Stat. 1876.
15 Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1970, at 40, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
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test should not be judged on the basis of how many votes it obtains.
It is more important to consider the effect that such a contest has both
on the decisions which are made by corporations and the process by
which such decisions are made. As reporter Jerry Flint observed on
the day of the General Motors meeting, "[t]he Campaign may not have
won many votes, but it may have captured the high moral ground and
the fight may just be beginning."'16
CONCLUSION
The growing social awareness characteristic of the late sixties has
finally hit the corporate structure in this country, as illustrated by the
Campaign GM proxy struggle. Indeed, America's business has a size-
able backlog of serious problems only now emerging into the lime-
light. Environmental destruction, the racial situation, the critical ne-
glect of housing, schools and mass transportation are among the more
prominent ones. And all of the problems and conditions are, in some
measure, the outgrowth of the phenomenal development of our eco-
nomic system.
The American system is based upon private ownership. Although
organizations do not directly wield power, they are no less powerful
because they contain the elements of power. In our large corporations,
the power is wielded by managers who are sometimes reluctant to admit
the great power they possess -largely unrestrained by the free market
system, labor unions or the federal government.
The root of society's problems is the manner in which myraid
decisions affecting men's lives are made. These decisions determine
how our resources are to be allocated. The realization of the power
possessed by the strong has led many businessmen to speak of the need
for corporate responsibility - a concept presumably indicating that
some corporate resources, including time and assets, will be dedicated
to the problems of the community. While clearly a step in the right
direction, it is not bold enough for it tries to alter the results of the
use of power without changing the power wielders. However, a corpo-
rate management sensitive to all the needs of the people - as distin-
guished from only the acquisitive needs of the people - could produce
different corporate priorities. As corporate management is presently
selected, we are not likely to see represented within the decision-making
16 N.Y. Times, May 22, 1970, at 18, col. 3. The prediction has been borne out -not
only by the launching of Campaign GM-Round I, Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1970, at 5, col. 3,
but by other proxy contests as well. Social Activists Switch to Proxy Power, Bus. WEEK,
Feb. 13, 1971, at 86.
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councils the views of minorities, poor people, young people committed
to a new life-style or the special viewpoint of women. The selection
of managers brings into focus the selection of directors, since they
choose the management and supposedly determine policy; but the selec-
tion of directors, in effect, is left to the managers. This circular process
in our major corporations allows no real room for new voices to be
heard. It is small wonder that growing numbers of persons perceiving
the great power amassed in the corporation and exercised by a few,
have become totally disaffected with our corporate state, and see little
point in discussing its reform.
Nonetheless, the system is workable and we must not reject it. It
is, however, necessary to re-think our concept of the model of the
decision-making apparatus of the corporation. Corporate economic
planning must be influenced by considerations other than those which
predominate at this time. Socially responsible conduct by a corporation
cannot be an afterthought, like a quarter in a blind man's cup. It must
be a basic ingredient in the conduct of the corporation's mission. It
must work towards assuring the end of racism. It must mean forsaking
planned ugliness and mediocrity in the ongoing creation of our cities.
Corporate responsibility could mean seeking alternatives to the internal
combustion engine. The tasks are obviously very difficult to achieve;
at present we are barely moving towards the solution. Can we find a
way, whereby the decisions on the corporate level stand a better chance
of serving society? The persons affected by the corporation must be
allowed to influence its decisions. This should mean that they can
participate in the selection of the governors. Reform of the electoral
process is needed.
We can approach this problem through revisions of state corpora-
tion law and enactment of a different method for the selection of direc-
tors, or we can seek voluntary acceptance by major corporations of
new approaches. To suggest several possibilities: the election process
could permit candidates nominated by persons other than management
to appear on the corporation's proxy statement; 17 representation on
the board from non-shareholders constituencies (such as employees and
consumers), can be accomplished;' 8 or a corporate responsibility com-
mittee made up of varied community interests could be formed, which
would monitor corporate decisions.
The law should require corporations to furnish greater informa-
tion to shareholders about the areas of corporate activity which have
17 Proxy Statement of Campaign GM -Round II, Proposal No. 1 (Nov. 19, 1970).
is Id. Proposal No. 2.
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significant social impact. Just as financial information is essential to
an investor, so is the information needed to enable assessment of man-
agers' social performance. 19 Presumably changes in the proxy rules can
be utilized for this purpose.20
Such are the problems which Campaign GM brought into focus.
The suggestions outlined above would go a long way toward resolution
of the dilemma. Absent implementation of some progressive program,
which would help the corporate system adapt itself to the changing
needs of a country in peril, the utilization of the proxy contest will
become increasingly ostensible, admittedly as a poor substitute.
Nevertheless, the fight is just beginning. Not even General Motors
claimed victory after last spring's meeting. Mr. Roche concluded his
post-meeting press conference with the following observation:
I don't think we won a victory. I think we won a vote of confidence
from our shareholders. I think we could lose that vote of confidence
very quicdy unless we respond in the way our shareholders expect
us to do to these problems, and that is what we intend to do.21
For the future, it is hoped that reform will be quickly forthcoming.
In the alternative, the proxy contest has proved itself to be a viable
device in the battle against corporate irresponsibility.
19 Id. Proposal No. 3.
20 Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69
Micn. L. REv. 419, 520 (1971).
21 N.Y. Times, May 23, 1970, at 15, col. 1.
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